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Why insurance for ‘black-swan’ events isn’t paying off in this bear market

Why insurance for 'black-swan' events isn't paying off in this bear market

The bear market on Wall Street is not a “black swan.” This is important is for semantic clarity, if nothing else. The term “black swan” has been thrown around with such abandon in recent months that it’s in danger of losing all meaning.

There’s a more important reason not call this bear market a black swan: it creates unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved with black-swan protection strategies. Those strategies hedge against certain rare events, but not everything bad that can happen in the stock market.

The black swan theory has a long history in philosophy and mathematics, but its use in the investment arena traces to the work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a professor of risk engineering at New York University. Taleb wrote a book in 2007 entitled “Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” in which he defines a black swan as an extremely rare and sudden event that has very severe consequences.

A key aspect of black-swan events, Taleb argued, is that they are unpredictable. This unpredictability means that, in order to protect yourself, you must always hedge your portfolio against the worst. That hedge will detract from your return in most years, but pay off in a big way in the event of a black swan.

A good analogy is to fire insurance on your house. House fires are extremely rare, but you still buy insurance against the possibility and are more than willing to pay your insurance premium.

Black-swan insurance in the investment arena pursues two general approaches. The first is to be as conservative as possible with almost all of your portfolio and extremely aggressive with the small remainder. The second is to couple your normal equity portfolio with an aggressive hedge — such as with deep out-of-the-money puts.

Neither of these strategies has offered complete protection against the current bear market, as you can see in the chart below. The three strategies listed in the chart are:

  • Swan Hedged Equity U.S. Large Cap ETF
    HEGD,
    -0.18%
    ,
    which invests more than 90% of its portfolio in large-cap stocks and hedges with put options.

  • Amplify BlackSwan Growth &Treasury Core ETF
    SWAN,
    -0.44%
    ,
    which invests 90% in U.S. Treasurys and 10% in S&P long-dated call options.

  • S&P 500
    SPX,
    -0.34%

    fund (96.67%) plus long-dated out-of-the money puts (3.33%). This specific strategy was derived by Michael Edesess, an adjunct professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, in an attempt to replicate the reported returns of a hedge fund (whose strategy is proprietary) with which Taleb is associated.

Clearly, all three approaches’ year-to-date losses are in the double-digits, with the Amplify BlackSwan ETF actually losing more than the S&P 500 itself.

These otherwise disappointing returns are not necessarily a criticism. If this year’s bear market is not a black swan event, then it doesn’t seem fair to criticize these offerings for failing to protect investors. For example, during the waterfall decline that accompanied the economic lockdowns at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is more appropriately classified as a black swan event, a portfolio that allocated 96.67% to the S&P 500 and 3.33% to deep out-of-the-money puts would have held its own or posted a small gain.

Hedging against more than black swans

Your comeback might be to suggest constructing portfolio hedges that insure against more than just black swan-like losses. But the cost of such hedges would be much greater than the insurance premium for protecting against a black swan. That cost could be so high, in fact, that you might decide it’s not worth it.

Consider fixed income annuities (FIAs), which allow you to participate in the stock market’s upside while guaranteeing that you never lose money. The “premium” you must pay for this insurance is that your participation rate — the share of the price-only gains that you earn — is often well-below 100%. Currently, for example, according to Adam Hyers of Hyers and Associates, a retirement-planning firm, an FIA benchmarked to the S&P 500 has a 30% participation rate — in effect setting its insurance premium to be 70% of the index’s gains in those years in which the stock market rises. 

Would you be willing to forfeit 70% of the S&P 500’s price-only gains in years the stock market rises, along with all dividend income, in order to avoid losses in those years in which the market falls? There’s no right or wrong answer. But you need to be aware of the magnitude of the insurance premium.

The chart above plots the calendar-year price-only returns of the S&P 500 since 1928. The red line shows what your return would have been since then — 3.7% annualized — if you were flat in years in which the index fell, and earned 30% of the index’s increase when it rose. That 3.7% annualized return is a lot less than the 10.0% annualized total return the stock market has produced over the past nine-plus decades.

I’m not suggesting that FIAs are never appropriate in certain circumstances. In an interview, Hyers told me that there are many different FIAs to choose, and some that are benchmarked to indexes other than the S&P 500 have higher participation rates than 30%. Indeed, he added in an email, “many of the [FIAs benchmarked to] proprietary indexes have… participation rates above 100%, so those are where larger gains are locked in.”

My point in discussing FIAs is instead to remind you that there is no free lunch. The more you want to insure against losses, the more upside potential you forfeit in the process. While it is possible to insure against a black swan event, such insurance won’t protect you from all losses.

Mark Hulbert is a regular contributor to MarketWatch. His Hulbert Ratings tracks invest/ment newsletters that pay a flat fee to be audited. He can be reached at mark@hulbertratings.com

More: Don’t fear the bear. It gives you chances to pick winning stocks and beat the market.

Also read:  ‘The stock market is not going to zero’: How this individual investor with 70 years of experience is trading the bear market

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GCC banks: Domestic deposits remain robust despite disruptive events

GCC banks: Domestic deposits remain robust despite disruptive events

Banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have remained stable despite political disruptions, which tend to trigger risk aversion among investors, prompting higher funding costs or even capital outflows from the system, according to a new report by S&P Global.  

For GCC banks, “the largest funding item–private domestic deposits–has increased year-on-year over the past three decades despite a series of disruptive regional events, including Yemeni civil wars, the Arab Spring uprisings, the Iraq War, Qatar boycott, and several Houthi missile attacks,” said analysts Benjamin Young and Mohamed Damak in the report.

The report pointed to four contributing factors that explain how GCC banking systems preserved deposit stability and maintained trend growth despite numerous geopolitical shocks.

Expatriates dominate the population, but not bank accounts: Although foreign residents comprise about 90 percent of the populations in Qatar and Dubai, they represent a far smaller percentage of retail deposits. In contrast, non-national retail deposits in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia represent less than 20 percent of the total because incentives for retaining out-of-contract migrant labor are less common, the ratings agency said.

Oil revenue has supported public spending, corporate development and population growth: Economic development policies backed by oil revenues have pulled vast amounts of expatriate labour to the region and incentivized corporate expansion, which has supported deposit growth.

Depositors from higher-risk countries add to stability: The stability of most GCC banking systems has led them to be seen as safe havens for savings,

investments, and business development from less stable countries in the wider Middle East and sub-continental Asia. While lower-paid migrants tend to be structural remitters, higher-paid workers are encouraged to retain wealth by the host. “The growth of the latter could increase deposit instability but can also be an important funding item if linked to longer-term incentives,” S&P said. 

Wealthy public sectors also support bank deposit stability: In the GCC, income from the sale of oil and gas underpins public sector deposit growth, which is generally routed through national oil and gas companies. Oil revenue has facilitated the development of some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds which have continued to earn returns during periods of low prices, the report said.

(Writing by Brinda Darasha; editing by  Daniel Luiz) 

brinda.darasha@lseg.com

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IL&FS Rs 55,000-cr Debt Resolved: The Timeline of Events So Far

IL&FS Rs 55,000-cr Debt Resolved: The Timeline of Events So Far

Nearly three years after veteran banker Uday Kotak was handed over the chairmanship of IL&FS board by the government, the new management has so far resolved debt worth Rs 55,000 crore, which is over half of its total outstanding of Rs 99,000 crore as of October 2018.

Of the 347 entities under the IL&FS Group as of October 2018, a total of 246 entities stand resolved, leaving 101 entities to be resolved in the next financial year.

The IF&FS group retained its overall resolution estimate at Rs 61,000 crore. The Rs 55,000-crore debt resolution represents over 90 per cent of the overall estimated resolution value. Resolution of the remaining Rs 6,000 crore debt will move into FY23.

The tenure of Kotak as non-executive chairman will end on April 2 and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has appointed C S Rajan as IL&FS’ chairman and MD for six months with effect from April 3. Here’s the timeline of the events so far:

How the Kotak-led new board resolved this debt

The new board followed a three-pronged strategy of ‘Resolution, Restructuring and Recovery’ to maximise recoveries for all classes of creditors. It also adopted an equitable distribution approach and balanced the interests of stakeholders.

IL&FS had a total outstanding debt of over Rs 99,000 crore as of October 2018. Out of this Rs 55,000-crore debt has been resolved through debt resolution initiatives, monetisation, debt discharge, cash available across companies and InvIT unit due to be issued, and transactions approved by courts and tribunals.

According to a statement by IL&FS group, “An application has been filed with the NCLAT for undertaking interim distribution of Rs 16,000 crore of cash and InvIT units available across the Group. Over 75 per cent of this will be distributed to creditors of three large holding companies – IL&FS, IFIN and ITNL.”

The incremental resolution of over Rs 2,700 crore since November 2021 comprises Rs 1,080 crore from sale of IL&FS Headquarters (TIFC) in BKC Mumbai, Rs 900 crore under Khed Sinnar claim settlement with NHAI, Rs 230 crore from settlement of IFIN’s non-performing loan accounts and Rs 520 crore from other recoveries. In addition, the Group continues to service debt of Rs 1,000 crore across companies.

ITNL completed transfer of two road assets, Sikar Bikaner Highway Ltd and Moradabad Bareilly Expressway Ltd, to Roadstar Infra Investment Trust at a cumulative enterprise valuation of Rs 4,200 crore, the group said in the statement.

Transfer of the remaining special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to the InvIT is being undertaken in multiple phases.

Events Before Uday Kotak at the helm (June-October 2018)

June: IL&FS Transportation Networks (ITNL), the group’s transport subsidiary, delayed a repayment of Rs 450 crore of inter-corporate deposits from Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI). Subsequently, rating companies ICRA and CARE Ratings downgraded ITNL’s debt papers/credit facilities citing weak financials.

In July, the IL&FS group’s founder and Chairman Ravi Parthasarathy stepped down, citing health reasons. LIC MD and nominee Hemant Bhargava took over as the group’s non-executive chairman

September

— Its another subsidiary IL&FS Financial Services defaulted on commercial paper repayments running in few hundred crores but it made the payment in the same month after 2-3 days

— The group defaulted on a Rs 1,000-crore loan, and one of its subsidiaries defaulted on Rs 500-crore dues owed to SIDBI.

— ICRA, CARE and Brickwork Ratings downgraded the group’s various borrowing programmes worth over Rs 12,000 crore to ‘default’ or ‘junk’ grades. ICRA removed all group entities from its rating watch.

— The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) initiated a special audit.

— The group defauled on several short-term loans, totalling Rs 440.46 crore, including bank loans, term deposits and short-term deposit.

— Former LIC chairman S B Mathur took over as the IL&FS group chairman on September 15.

— September 18: Markets regulator Sebi started looking into the IL&FS matter with regards to rating agencies and the impact on mutual funds.

— September 21: DSP Mutual fund sold commercial papers of Dewan Housing Finance Ltd (DHFL). IL&FS Financial Services MD and CEO Ramesh C Bawa resigned.

— September 24: IL&FS lost access to fundraising through commercial papers.

— September 29: IL&FS at its annual general meeting raised Rs 4,500 crore via rights issue and increased borrowing limit to Rs 35,000 crore, from Rs 25,000 crore. It roped in Alvarez and Marsal as a specialist agency to execute its debt restructuring plan.

In October, the government-appointed new board superseded the company’s previous one, under the chairmanship of Uday Kotak and five other new board members.

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